Blockhead and Aunt Bertha are part of a class of objections which charge that the Turing test does not constitute a sufficient condition for intelligence on the grounds that there are trivial programs which can pass it through memorization. An example such objection might begin by arguing that it is logically possible to construct a computer program in the following way:
1. Perform a Turing test with a sequence of questions with a human (call her Bertha) respondent 2. Record those responses on a hash structure on storage. 3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for each possible Turing test sequence of questions.
Once this setup procedure is completed, the objection specifies the following rule for interactions in the interrogation: when posed with a question from an interrogator, have the program look up Bertha’s responses in the hashtable. Because we have enumerated all possible Turing test sequences, the appropriate response should be somewhere in it.
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